Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians v. D.D. & D.D., No. 1D2026-0482 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 19, 2026)
Not every Florida termination of parental rights case is brought by the Department of Children and Families. Grandparents, stepparents, and other relatives file private petitions, and those cases carry every one of the federal obligations that attach to a state termination proceeding, including the Indian Child Welfare Act. A recent decision from the First District Court of Appeal is a useful reminder of how far one of those obligations reaches, and of how late in a case it can surface.
What happened
A child was born in 2012 to a mother who is a member of the Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians. In 2014, the tribal court determined that the child was neither a member of the Tribe nor eligible for membership. The child’s paternal grandparents later obtained custody, moved with the child to Florida, and in August 2025 petitioned the circuit court in Bay County to terminate both parents’ rights. The father surrendered. The mother contested.
Twice during the proceeding, the question of the child’s tribal status was answered the same way. In November 2025, the Tribe’s chairman advised that the child was not a member and not eligible, and that the Tribe would not intervene. At the termination trial later that month, a tribal witness testified to the same effect. The circuit court found that the Indian Child Welfare Act did not apply and entered final judgment terminating parental rights on December 5, 2025.
Then, on December 16, 2025, the Tribe’s voters ratified a constitutional amendment expanding membership eligibility. On December 30, the Tribe moved to intervene. On January 2, 2026, the federal Department of the Interior approved the amendment, making it effective under federal law. See 25 U.S.C. § 5123(a). Three days later, the Tribe filed an affidavit asserting that the amendment made the child eligible for membership as the biological child of a tribal member.
The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing. Its reasoning was one that will sound familiar to anyone who has litigated these cases: the final judgment had already been entered, Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes does not authorize intervention at that stage, and allowing a new party into the case after judgment would be “inconsistent with the finality of this Court’s final judgment and the child’s need to reach permanency.”
What the First District held
The First District reversed on this narrow issue.
The Indian Child Welfare Act provides that in a state court proceeding to terminate parental rights, an Indian child’s tribe “shall have a right to intervene at any point in the proceeding.” 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c). The court read that language as written. The right is mandatory, and it need not be exercised at the outset. See Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255, 267 (2023); In re T.D., 890 So. 2d 473, 474–75 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
Two conclusions followed. The first concerns preemption. Florida law does not permit non-party intervention under Chapter 39. See K.N. v. Department of Children & Families, 359 So. 3d 741, 745 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). Where state law directly conflicts with the force or purpose of a federal statute, the state rule gives way. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). The First District placed this holding alongside its own earlier decision in J.P.H. v. Florida Department of Children & Families, 39 So. 3d 560, 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), which held that state prohibitions on the unauthorized practice of law are preempted where they would keep a tribe’s counsel out of a covered proceeding, and alongside G.L. v. Department of Children & Families, 80 So. 3d 1065, 1067 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), which held that the Act’s post-judgment challenge provisions preempt the traditional rules of preservation of error.
The second conclusion concerns finality, and it is the one with the broadest practical reach. Section 1911(c) draws no distinction between trial-level and appellate-level proceedings, and nothing in the statute suggests the right lapses when the trial court signs the judgment. Florida law agrees on when a case ends: “The general rule is that an action remains pending in the trial court until after a final judgment and such time as an appeal is taken or time for an appeal expires. If an appeal is taken, the action is still pending until final disposition.” Wilson v. Clark, 414 So. 2d 526, 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Because the Tribe moved to intervene on December 30, 2025, the December 5 judgment had not reached that point. The proceeding was still pending, and the right to intervene was still live.
The court supported that reading with the statutory architecture surrounding termination and adoption. Prospective adoptive parents may not file a petition for adoption until the termination judgment becomes final. § 39.812(6), Fla. Stat. (2025). A termination order placing a child for subsequent adoption is suspended while an appeal is pending. § 39.815, Fla. Stat. (2025). And a judgment of adoption is entered only after the court determines that the time to appeal the termination judgment has passed with no appeal pending. § 63.142(4), Fla. Stat. (2025). Read together, those provisions describe a system that does not treat a termination judgment as the end of anything until the appellate clock has run.
The court was careful about the limits of what it decided. It did not hold that the Act applies retroactively to actions substantially completed before it became applicable, particularly where the tribe had proper notice or actually participated. On remand, the trial court must determine whether the child is classified as an Indian child under 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). If the child is, the Tribe must be allowed to intervene, and the court must then determine what impact, if any, that intervention has on the proceedings as of the time the Act became applicable.
Why this matters
For families pursuing a private petition, the work this decision calls for belongs at the beginning of a case. The question of whether a child is an Indian child is not a formality to be cleared at the first hearing and then set aside. Tribal membership criteria are set by tribes, and tribes can change them. A determination that was accurate in November may not be accurate in January. In this case, the 2014 tribal court determination and both answers given during the proceeding were accurate when given, and the case still turned on an amendment ratified 11 days after the judgment.
Section 63.087(4)(e)2., Florida Statutes, requires an adoption-related termination petition to include all information required by the Indian Child Welfare Act, and federal regulation puts a parallel duty on the court to ask each participant, at the start of the proceeding, whether anyone knows or has reason to know the child is an Indian child. 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a). Many practitioners answer both with a sworn affidavit from the parent, filed with the petition, attesting to the absence of tribal membership or heritage in the immediate and extended family. That is worth doing. What Stillaguamish shows is that it is not the end of the obligation. The answers in that case were accurate when given, including two from the Tribe itself, and the case still turned on an amendment ratified after judgment. Where a case is contested and moves slowly, the applicable law and the child’s status under it must be reviewed again before the appellate clock runs out.
The same regulation lists what constitutes reason to know, including information from any participant, court officer, tribe, Indian organization, or agency; a statement from the child; domicile or residence on a reservation or in an Alaska Native village; the child’s status as a ward of a tribal court; and tribal membership identification held by a parent or the child. 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(c). Where there is any tribal connection on either side of a child’s family, the inquiry belongs at the front of the case and it belongs in the record. A termination judgment that is later reopened is difficult for everyone involved, and it is hardest on the child, whose permanency is the thing the delay costs.
For counsel handling these cases at the trial level, the finality point deserves particular attention. A judgment is not the end of exposure. Until the time for appeal has run or the appeal has been decided, the proceeding is considered pending, and rights that attach to a pending proceeding remain available to those who hold them, however belatedly in the process.
The Law Offices of Dayna Maeder handles private petitions to terminate parental rights and family adoptions at both the trial and appellate levels, including stepparent, second parent, and relative adoptions, under both Chapter 39 and Chapter 63. Contact Law Offices of Dayna Maeder to discuss your Florida parental rights and adoption needs.
This opinion is not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.330 or 9.331. This post is general information about a published decision and is not legal advice about any particular case.
