Florida now has a statewide rule requiring every person who signs a court filing to represent that the authorities cited in it exist and are accurately cited. The rule took effect on June 15, 2026. It is short, it binds attorneys and self-represented litigants alike, and it arrived after more than a year of Florida appellate decisions confronting filings built on hallucinated cases, or cases submitted for an incorrect proposition of law.
Two of the decisions that shaped this area came out of domestic relations cases. For attorneys who refer appellate work out, or who sign briefs substantially prepared by someone else, pay attention: the obligation the courts are enforcing attaches to the signature. Although that concept is not new, the additional warnings show that the judiciary is cracking down.
What the rule requires
Until June 15, 2026, Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.515(d)(2) provided that on filing, each signer represents that “(A) the signer has read the document; (B) to the best of the signer’s knowledge, information, and belief, there are good grounds to support the document; and (C) the document is not interposed for delay.” Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.045(d) carries that requirement into the appellate courts: “All documents filed with the court must be signed as required by Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.515.”
In In re: Amendments to Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.515, No. SC2026-0673, 2026 WL 1487646 (Mem) (Fla. May 28, 2026), the Supreme Court, on its own motion and unanimously, added a fourth representation, designated 2.515(d)(2)(D): “the legal authorities identified exist and are accurately cited.” The amendment took effect June 15, 2026, at 12:01 a.m., and applies “both to filings prepared by attorneys and to filings prepared by unrepresented parties.”
The Court was explicit about why. Generative artificial intelligence tools “can generate content that appears plausible but is in fact inaccurate, including fabricated or ‘hallucinated’ authorities.” The rule responds to that risk without regulating the tools.
The amendment carries its own sanctions provision: the court may, on its own motion or a party’s motion, “impose sanctions for any filing inconsistent with this representation after providing the signer notice and an opportunity to be heard,” and “[s]uch sanctions may include reprimand, contempt, striking of the document, dismissal of proceedings, costs, attorneys’ fees, or other sanctions.”
That menu closely tracks the sanctions already available in the appellate courts under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.410(a), which includes “reprimand, contempt, striking of briefs or pleadings, dismissal of proceedings, costs, attorneys’ fees, or other sanctions,” though the Court traced the new provision to a different source. Its commentary explains that the amendments were adopted “principally to create a statewide, uniform replacement for varied circuit court administrative orders imposing disclosure and certification requirements about the use of artificial intelligence in filings.” Those administrative orders had contained their own sanctions provisions, and the Court included an express one “to avoid uncertainty over courts’ continuing authority to impose sanctions in this context, as provided for in the circuit court administrative orders that have been replaced.” It then disclaimed any broader effect: in doing so, the Court did “not intend to change or comment on (by negative implication or otherwise) courts’ existing authority to impose sanctions for noncompliance with these rules generally.”
So the new provision supplies an express basis for sanctions, and the Court took no position, by negative implication or otherwise, on the authority courts already had. Consistent with that, when the Fourth District acted in August it cited both rule 2.515(d)(2) and rule 9.410(a).
Two details in the rule’s structure are easy to miss. The sanctions paragraph sits at the end of subdivision (d)(2), so it reaches any filing inconsistent with the signer’s representation under (A) through (D), not the new subdivision alone. And the two provisions are triggered differently: 9.410(a) operates “[a]fter 10 days’ notice, on its own motion” and reaches rule violations and frivolous or bad-faith filings, while 2.515(d)(2) permits action “on its own motion or the motion of a party,” on notice and an opportunity to be heard, keyed to the accuracy of what the signer represented.
One practical note on the rule’s status: because the amendments were not published for comment before adoption, the Court gave interested persons 75 days to file comments, which closed on August 11, 2026. The rule has been in force since June 15 regardless, but as of the date of this post, the Court may yet revise it.
The problem was not new
The Sixth District’s opinion in Hessert v. Hessert, 431 So. 3d 610 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026), collected what had already accumulated across three districts: Russell v. Mells, 426 So. 3d 913 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025), and Clerk of Court & Comptroller for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County v. Rangel, 427 So. 3d 1069 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025), both involving attorneys; and Takefman v. Pickleball Club, LLC, 418 So. 3d 826 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025), Goya v. Hayashida, 418 So. 3d 652 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025), and Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 399 So. 3d 1185 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024), involving self-represented litigants. As the Fourth District put it in Goya, “An attempt to persuade a court or oppose an adversary by relying on fake opinions is an abuse of the adversary system.” Goya, 418 So. 3d at 655.
The framework: Hessert
Hessert v. Hessert, 431 So. 3d 610 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026), decided March 20, 2026, arose from a certiorari petition filed by a self-represented petitioner in a domestic relations case out of Orange County. The court denied the petition without further discussion and then wrote to address the citations.
Check out this math: The petition cited 13 cases. Five did not exist. Four more existed but were cited for propositions they do not represent. Only four of the 13 were both real and accurately used.
The court surveyed the appellate rules, the rules of judicial administration, the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the case law, and stated the principle the rest of this line runs on: “there is simply no excuse for pro se litigants or attorneys to file briefs, motions, and other filings in Florida’s appellate courts that cite to cases without first performing the necessary and simple steps of (1) cite-checking the cases to ensure they actually exist and (2) cite-checking the cases to ensure they actually represent the legal propositions asserted.” That obligation holds “regardless of whether such filings are prepared with or without the assistance of AI.” The opinion makes this point three separate times.
Two passages deserve particular attention.
The first is the court’s forewarning about verification, which forecloses the workflow most likely to feel like a solution: filers “cannot satisfy their aforementioned obligation by relying upon AI to cite-check the cases cited in their filings.” Not a different model, not a second pass. The obligation is to read and analyze the cases.
The second is Hessert‘s quotation of Boca Burger, Inc. v. Forum, 912 So. 2d 561, 571 (Fla. 2005), which speaks directly to divided representation: “[Appellate courts] depend on counsel to accurately state both the facts and the applicable law. Therefore, regardless of trial counsel’s conduct or representations, appellate counsel (who often is separate from trial counsel) has an independent ethical obligation to present both the facts and the applicable law accurately and forthrightly.”
Hessert denied the petition, directed the petitioner to file an indexed supplemental appendix containing every cited case that actually exists with the supporting language highlighted, and issued an order to show cause. Among the potential sanctions the court identified was a requirement that a member of the Florida Bar in good standing review and sign any future filings in that court on her behalf in any matter in which she seeks review of the underlying action.
The framework applied to a lawyer: Rodriguez
Three weeks later, the same court applied Hessert to a member of the Bar, in another Orange County domestic relations case. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, No. 6D2025-3086, 2026 WL 969721 (Fla. 6th DCA Apr. 10, 2026), involved a certiorari petition that fell into the same three categories: some cases real and accurately cited, some cases that do not exist, and some real cases cited for propositions they do not support. The court dismissed the petition without further discussion and wrote to address the citations, observing that the petition “bears the hallmarks of having been produced by” counsel “with the assistance of generative artificial intelligence” but without sufficient guardrails to ensure accuracy.
Rodriguez expressly adopted and incorporated Hessert‘s reasoning in full, noting that Hessert had involved a self-represented litigant but finding its reasoning persuasive as to counsel. The court directed counsel to produce the real cases, indexed and highlighted, for both the petition and the reply, and to show cause within 10 days why she should not be sanctioned and why she should not be referred to the Florida Bar.
Dismissal did not end it: Kings Roofing
Kings Roofing NWFL, LLC v. Fusion Works Construction, LLC, No. 6D2025-1251, 2026 WL 1458681 (Mem) (Fla. 6th DCA May 22, 2026), is the decision most likely to surprise practitioners. The parties filed a joint stipulation for dismissal. The Sixth District dismissed the appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.350(c), and expressly retained jurisdiction to pursue possible sanctions against appellant’s counsel, whose initial brief contained citations that appeared to be fabricated. Citing Rodriguez, the court issued the same directives: produce the real cases with highlighted support, and show cause on both sanctions and a Bar referral.
The parties’ agreement resolved the appeal. It did not resolve the court’s interest in the brief.
Referral imposed: JMOR Properties
JMOR Properties, LLC v. Artist Alley Townhomes, LLC, No. 4D2026-1787, 2026 WL 2328995 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 12, 2026), is where a threatened referral became an actual one, and it is the most instructive of the group, because counsel’s explanation was a sympathetic one.
The petition sought certiorari review of an order vacating a clerk’s default. The Fourth District described it as “riddled with false citations and arguments,” including an unsupported assertion that the court had “repeatedly entertained, and granted, certiorari review of orders vacating clerk’s defaults,” supported by a non-existent case attributed to that court. In fact the court lacks jurisdiction, and that has been settled since at least 1979. See Leibman v. Sportatorium, Inc., 374 So. 2d 1124, 1124 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
Counsel’s response accepted responsibility and explained: his practice is to have AI software research and draft the initial document, after which he verifies every citation and revises. He said he had done that here and removed the fabricated citations, but while making final edits worked from the wrong version and filed the AI’s initial draft. He attached the revised petition he had meant to file.
The court rejected the excuse on its own terms. “Counsel’s explanation that he mistakenly submitted the wrong draft of the petition does not excuse the failure to verify the accuracy of all citations in his filing,” citing rule 2.515(d)(2)(D), and then did something more consequential. It read the revised petition, the one counsel said he intended to file, and found that it too failed to disclose clearly established contrary law. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.3(a)(3). “Any competent research (using AI or otherwise) should have revealed the abundant caselaw directly addressing our lack of jurisdiction, which has been settled since at least 1979.”
That failure was treated as a competence problem: “Even if counsel is truthful in his assertion that he was not intentionally trying to mislead this Court, the failure to discover the controlling law shows a violation of the duty of competence.” R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.1. The court referred the matter to the Florida Bar under Rule 3-7.18(a)(2), invoking rule 2.515(d)(2) and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.410(a), and quoting the Second District: “When a lawyer cites imaginary legal authorities to our court as if they were law, we are compelled to refer that lawyer to the Bar because of the professional rules of conduct.” Russell v. Mells, 426 So. 3d 913, 920 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025).
Between Kings Roofing and JMOR, the Fourth District had picked up the same language in Eclectic Synergy, LLC v. Seredin, 2026 WL 1475836 (Fla. 4th DCA May 27, 2026), quoting Hessert: “An attorney is subject to sanctions for filings that contain fictitious authority or ‘cite actual cases for inaccurate legal propositions.'”
Where these cases stand
The obvious question after reading these decisions is what the sanction turned out to be. In three of the four, the published opinion does not say.
These cases move in stages. The court decides the appeal, issues an order to show cause, counsel responds, and the court then disposes of the sanctions question. A published opinion usually captures the first two stages. The disposition often arrives later, in an order that is not typically published.
Hessert denied the petition and issued an order to show cause. Rodriguez dismissed the petition and ordered counsel to show cause why she should not be sanctioned and why she should not be referred to the Florida Bar. Kings Roofing dismissed the appeal on the parties’ stipulation, retained jurisdiction, and issued the same two-part order. None of the three reports what came next.
JMOR is the exception because the Fourth District wrote at the last stage rather than the first. It had dismissed the petition and issued its order to show cause on June 30, 2026. The August 12 opinion rules on counsel’s response, and the sanction it imposed was a referral to the Florida Bar under Rule 3-7.18(a)(2). Not a fine, not fees, not striking the filing.
That choice deserves attention, because the courts describe it as one they do not really have. The Second District’s formulation, quoted approvingly in JMOR, is that when a lawyer cites imaginary authorities as if they were law, courts “are compelled to refer that lawyer to the Bar because of the professional rules of conduct.” Russell, 426 So. 3d at 920. “Compelled” suggests that where the authority is invented rather than merely misread, referral is the expected outcome.
The lever is different for self-represented litigants. Among the potential sanctions Hessert identified was a requirement that a member of the Florida Bar in good standing review and sign any future filing the petitioner makes in that court in any matter seeking review of the underlying action. For a litigant with no license at stake, a restriction on filing is a typical consequence.
What these decisions actually require
The duty is not about artificial intelligence. Hessert said so three times, and the decisions since have not retreated from it. A fabricated citation from a stale form file or a misremembered case is treated no differently. The technology explains how the problem arrived at scale; it does not change the standard.
Verification cannot be delegated to AI. Hessert is explicit.
A clean citation list is not sufficient. This is JMOR‘s contribution. Counsel’s revised draft may well have contained only real cases, accurately cited, and it was still deficient, because it omitted controlling adverse authority that any competent research would have surfaced. Confirming that the cases exist answers half the question. Whether the research found the law that governs is the other half, and it is the half that produced a competence finding.
Getting out of the case does not get you out of the exposure. Kings Roofing retained jurisdiction after a stipulated dismissal.
The representation runs to the signer. Rule 2.515(d)(2) attaches the certification to the person who signs. Boca Burger puts the point in ethical terms that matter most where representation is divided: appellate counsel’s obligation is independent, and it does not shift based on what trial counsel did or said. For attorneys who send appellate work to contract counsel, share drafting with co-counsel, or sign briefs prepared substantially by others, that allocation is vital.
A practical note
Nothing in this line suggests Florida’s appellate courts are hostile to the technology. Hessert acknowledged that AI “may have appropriate uses in the legal field,” and JMOR framed its competence analysis around research done “using AI or otherwise.” What the courts are enforcing is an old obligation under new pressure: read the case, confirm it says what you are telling the court it says, and find the authority that cuts against you before your opponent or the panel does. Candor to the court is not new. The firms at risk are not the ones using new tools. Check your work!
The Law Offices of Dayna Maeder provides appellate counsel and litigation support to Florida trial attorneys, including briefing, research, and consultation on appellate strategy. Contact Law Offices of Dayna Maeder to discuss your Florida appellate needs.
Opinions discussed here are not final until disposition of any timely filed motion for rehearing, and several remain unreleased for publication in the permanent law reports and subject to revision or withdrawal. This post is general information about published decisions and a rule amendment, and is not legal advice about any particular matter.
