Many dependency appeals that turn on findings exist because there was an omission in required findings that appears (or, is missing from) the face of the order.
What makes this area harder than it looks is that the required findings are not one list. They change with the hearing. Six recent decisions, taken together, show how much turns on identifying which hearing you are actually in.
Shelter Hearings
Section 39.402(8)(h), Florida Statutes, requires an order placing a child in shelter care to identify the parties present and to contain seven written findings. The fifth is that the Department “has made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from the home.”
That one has a built-in exception that is easy to miss. The statute goes on to say that a finding of reasonable effort “may be made and the department is deemed to have made reasonable efforts” if, among other things, “[t]he first contact of the department with the family occurs during an emergency.”
In Department of Children and Families v. M.C., 327 So. 3d 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021), the trial court found probable cause for dependency and found that an emergency required the Department’s involvement, then denied the shelter petition anyway on the ground that the Department had not made reasonable efforts. The Fifth District reversed:
According to the plain language of section 39.402(8)(h) 5., once the trial court determined that DCF first became involved due to an emergency, the requirement that DCF use reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the Children was established.
Id. at 1237.
A second Fifth District case shows the same statutory-text discipline applied to the threshold. In Department of Children and Families v. D.H.C., 360 So. 3d 454 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023), a newborn was removed while her two older siblings remained in out-of-home care under open dependency cases. The trial court acknowledged the parents’ history but found no imminent harm to the newborn. The Fifth District reversed, because section 39.01(2) defines abuse to include “the birth of a new child into a family during the course of an open dependency case when the parent or caregiver has been determined to lack the protective capacity to safely care for the children in the home and has not substantially complied with the case plan towards successful reunification or met the conditions for return of the children into the home.” Id. at 457. The open cases themselves established probable cause.
D.H.C. also settles the appellate posture. “An order denying a shelter petition is a final order, in that judicial labor ends on the matter upon denial of the Department’s shelter petition.” Id. at 456. Review is de novo.
Adjudication Hearings
At adjudication the statute asks for less than practitioners sometimes assume, and the rule asks for more than the statute. Section 39.507(6) requires the court to incorporate its dependency finding in an order “briefly stating the facts upon which the finding is made.” Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.332(a) requires a written order “stating the legal basis for a finding of dependency, specifying the facts upon which the finding of dependency is based, and stating whether the court made the finding by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence,” and requires the court to include the dates of the adjudicatory hearing.
The standard-of-proof recital has no statutory counterpart. It is a rule requirement.
D.K. v. Department of Children and Families, 338 So. 3d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022), is the case to cite for what that means, because it is an affirmance:
The written order need not be extensive; the order need only briefly state facts, which are drawn directly from the evidence presented at the hearing and support a dependency adjudication.
Id. at 470. The order there recited the photographs, named the witnesses, and stated the court’s conclusion that the injury “clearly depicts a handprint.” That was enough.
D.K. is also a preservation lesson. The father argued on appeal that the court improperly relied on hearsay from the shelter hearing. The trial court had said repeatedly that it was doing exactly that, and counsel affirmatively stated he was not objecting. The First District declined to reach it. Id. at 469-70.
The noticed hearing
T.M.W. v. Department of Children and Families, 327 So. 3d 290 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), is short and worth reading in full. In it, the court’s order set the next hearing as a judicial review. The Department’s social study report identified it as a judicial review and checked “No” next to the question whether it was also a permanency review. At the hearing, the court entered a permanent guardianship and terminated supervision.
The Fourth District reversed:
A “judicial review” and a “permanency hearing” are not the same thing, and the terms may not be used interchangeably. Each is subject to its own governing statutes and procedural rule.
Id. at 291. Judicial review is governed by section 39.701 and rule 8.415. Permanency runs through section 39.621, section 39.6221 and rule 8.425. Because the hearing was billed as the former, the mother “did not have fair notice that the court may enter a final permanency order.” Id. at 291-92.
The Department and the guardian argued they had complied with section 39.621(4)(a) by filing a report recommending a change of goal. The court’s answer was that a change in the case plan goal is not the same thing as entry of a permanent guardianship.
Permanent Guardianship Hearings
Section 39.6221(1) sets six conditions for placing a child in a permanent guardianship, and section 39.6221(2) tells the court what its written order must do: list why the parents are not fit and why reunification is not possible, state why guardianship instead of adoption, and specify visitation with parents, grandparents and siblings.
Guardian ad Litem v. S.P., 412 So. 3d 944 (Fla. 5th DCA 2025), is the recent authority, and the appellants there were the Department and the guardian. After a bifurcated adjudicatory hearing on a petition to terminate the mother’s rights, the trial court denied the petition and closed the case in permanent guardianship on its own motion. The Fifth District reversed:
[N]o party pled or requested the case to close in permanent guardianship or was given any notice before or during the adjudicatory hearing that the court would close the case in permanent guardianship. In addition, the court failed to make any of the findings required by section 39.6221, Florida Statutes (2024).
Id. at 950.
S.P. then holds something that had not been squarely decided: the notice principle runs in both directions. Terminating parental rights on an unpled ground denies the parent due process, and “when a trial court denies DCF’s petition based on grounds not pled in the petition and not requested at the hearing, the trial court similarly violates DCF’s right to procedural due process.” Id. at 951.
Reunification Hearings
Section 39.621(10)(c) lists six factors that “must be considered and addressed in the findings of fact of the order” on a parent’s motion for reunification or increased contact: compliance with the case plan, whether the circumstances causing dependency have been resolved, the stability and longevity of the placement, the child’s preference if old enough, the current custodian’s recommendation, and the guardian ad litem’s recommendation.
In Interest of B.P., 367 So. 3d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023), the order noted that the Department objected to reunification and said nothing about the rest. The Second District treated the appeal as a petition for certiorari, because an order denying reunification entered after adjudication but before termination of supervision is not final. On the merits, “[a] finding regarding each of these factors is mandatory and vital to a proper order denying reunification.” Id. at 597-98 (quoting C.D. v. Department of Children and Families, 974 So. 2d 495, 500 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)). Omitting them “constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law causing irreparable harm.” Id. at 599.
One thing has changed since B.P.
B.P. also held that a parent did not have to file a motion for rehearing to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the findings, because no juvenile rule required it. Id. at 598.
A rule does now. Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.265(b)(4) provides:
To preserve for appeal a challenge to the failure of the trial court to make required findings of fact in the final order, a party must raise that issue in a motion for rehearing under this rule.
The Second District addressed the amendment in March 2026 in Interest of M.L., 430 So. 3d 334 (Fla. 2d DCA 2026), granting certiorari where an order denying reunification failed to address the section 39.621(10)(c) factors. In a footnote the court explained that rule 8.265(b)(4) was adopted after B.P. and requires preservation by rehearing motion, then added that “[t]he new version of rule 8.265 does not apply in this case because the order denying the father’s motion for reunification is not a final order.”
So the line now runs through finality. A final order missing required findings needs a motion for rehearing to preserve the issue. A non-final order reviewed by certiorari does not.
Takeaway
Before arguing that an order is deficient, identify three things in this order: which hearing produced it, which statute supplies the findings for that hearing, and whether the order is final. The first tells you what was required. The second gives you the list. The third tells you whether you need to file a rehearing motion within 10 days and whether your vehicle is an appeal or a petition for certiorari. (And remember, a rehearing motion does not toll the time for an appeal!)
Getting that sequence wrong is how a meritorious argument gets decided on something else.
A note for trial attorneys
Read the notice of hearing and the social study report before the hearing, and if the relief the court appears headed toward is not the relief the hearing was noticed for, be sure to say so on the record. T.M.W. and S.P. were both won on that point, one by a parent and one by the Department.
When a final order comes back missing findings, calendar the rehearing motion immediately. Rule 8.265(b)(1) gives 10 days from rendition, rule 8.265(b)(3) says the motion does not toll the time to appeal, and the motion is deemed denied if the court does not rule within 10 days. Both clocks run at once.
The Law Offices of Dayna Maeder handles dependency, termination of parental rights, family law, and adoption appeals in Florida’s district courts of appeal, and provides litigation support to trial attorneys on preservation of error and building the record. Contact Law Offices of Dayna Maeder to discuss your Florida appellate needs.
Adapted in part from “Preserve & Protect the Dependency Record for Appeals,” a continuing legal education program presented by the author for Florida’s Children First in June 2026.
This post is general information about published decisions and is not legal advice about any particular case.
